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This Note will examine the differences between trademark registration and
domain name registration, focusing specifically on the terms an applicant may
register, the rights associated with those registrations, and the manner in which
a registrant may lose, assign, and enforce those rights so that others my not use
the same registered terms. This Note will also suggest that a company operating
exclusively over the internet may obtain greater rights, and therefore protection,
than a typical bricks and mortar company, simply by registering its domain name,
and not trademark status.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine two companies: Internetbank and Baybank. Both companies are
FDIC banks. Internetbank operates exclusively over the internet, with no
physical location for its customers to visit, while Baybank is a traditional bricks
and mortar bank, with physical locations around the bay area of Maryland.
Internetbank is capable of serving the entire United States area, while Baybank is
locally operated and run and services customers only in the specific bay area of
Maryland. To open an account with Internetbank, a customer must fill-out an
application over the internet, while at Baybank, accounts must be opened in
person. These banks compete with other banks for the same business, and
therefore, have an interest in preventing their competitors from being able to use
these same names, Internetbank and Baybank, in their businesses. The catch,
however, is that only one of these banks will be successful.
The laws governing these banks' ability to prevent their competitors from
calling themselves by the same name are known as trademark laws. The law of
trademark is governed by the common law and by the Lanham Act. As will be
discussed, neither company would be able to use the existing trademark laws to
exclude competitors from using these same non-distinctive names, Internetbank
and Baybank. But, because Internetbank operates over the internet, other laws
such as those governing domain name registration may provide an avenue for this
bank to establish an exclusive right in this non-distinctive name, although
trademark law would not
Companies that operate over the internet exist at one specific site defined by
a domain name. Only one company may occupy a site at a time, and because each
site has a corresponding domain name, only one company may use a specific
domain name. To access the site for an internet-based company, a customer must
enter a domain name on an internet browser. By using the name of the company
as the domain name, it is possible for a company to establish exclusive rights in
that name.
Ideally, companies want to use the name of their company as a domain name
so that it is easier for consumers to find. When a company such as Internetbank
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is a totally intemet-based company, its domain name can be its company name.
Thus, in this way, Intemetbank would be able to establish exclusive rights in its
name, while Baybank would not.
II. BACKGROUND
A. COMMON LAW IRADEMARK RIGH1S
A trademark is any "word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof... to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by. others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown."' A trademark can, therefore, be
any symbol, ranging from a sound, such as the NBC three "chimes," to a shape,
such as the Coca-Cola bottle, as long as it identifies the source of goods.
2
Trademarks have been in existence for the past 4,000 years.' Tradesmen first
used them to identify their goods, to serve as a guarantee of quality, and as a
means to advertise." Before the Lanham Act was enacted in 1946,' the common
law recognized an owner's rights to protected trademarks under certain
conditions.6
The common law created four categories of trademarks with a sliding-scale
protection: arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.7 Completely arbitrary
marks receive the strongest protection while completely generic marks receive no
protection.9 Because the costs of creating exclusive rights in words or symbols
can be extremely high, such as the cost of removing these words from everyday
usage, trademark law seeks to protect only distinctive marks."0
IROBERTP. MERGES, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTYIN THE NEWTECHNoLOGICALAGE 566 (2d
ed. 2000). See 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1946).
2 MERGES, supra note 1, at 569.
3 Id at 557. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 1-14
(1885) (tracing the history of trademarks).
4 Id
s15 U.S.C. S 1051 (1946).
6 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir. 1974).
7 Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979).
' Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
9 Id
" Jane C. Ginsburg, Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 112 (3d ed. 2001) (depleting "the
language of terms useful or necessary"); see Abercrombie & Finch v. Hunting World, 537 F.2d 4 (2d
Cir. 1976), Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (noting, "color
depletion" cost for color marks).
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Arbitrary marks are inherently distinctive marks. They do not describe a
product or relate to the product in any way." These terms are usually made-up
words, and the costs associated with creating exclusive rights in these types of
words are minimal." An example would be naming a shoe brand "Keds."
Because the mark "Keds" has nothing to do with the shoes, it is a completely
arbitrary name for a shoe brand, and therefore, receives the highest protection.
The second category of marks is suggestive. Suggestive marks are also
inherently distinctive." These marks describe the product in a way that is only
suggestive, meaning that the name of the product requires the customer to think
about the connection between the name and the type of product. 4 These types
of marks are also referred to as "evocative marks."'" Many suggest that these
types of marks "cleverly connote qualities about the product or service."' 6 An
example of a suggestive name for a brand of shoes would be "Nike." Nike is the
Greek Goddess of Victory. Because customers are likely to associate athletic
performance with the type of shoe that they wear, the mark suggests the
connection between the name and the type of product. The mark also allows the
consumer to draw an inference about the great quality of the product. Thus,
unlike completely arbitrary marks, which convey no information to the consumer,
these marks help the consumer, but only in suggestive way. Because the costs
associated with exclusive use are relatively low, these marks also receive strong
protection.
The third category of protection is for descriptive marks. Descriptive marks
are divided into two categories-those that are merely descriptive and those that
have achieved a secondary meaning. 7 Descriptive marks are exactly as they
sound. They describe the product by identifying a characteristic or quality of the
product," by using common or ordinary words.'9
If the term is merely descriptive, it only describes the product to the customer
and creates no other meaning in the mind of the consumer.' On the other hand,
" Zatarain's, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
12 Nolo's Legal Encyclopedia, athttp://www.nolo.com/encylopedia/articles/tc/pct27.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2001) (on file with author).
1 Zatarain's, 698 F.2d at 791 ("A suggestive mark is protected without the necessity for proof
of secondary meaning.").
14 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763.
's Nolo's Legal Encyclopedia, smpra note 12.
16 Id
'7 See Zatarain's, 698 F.2d at 786 (noting the difference between descriptive marks that may be
"elevated to trademark status" and those that cannot).
18 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763. See Vision Ctr. v. Optiks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115-16 (5th Cir.
1979); seegeneral/ 15 U.S.C.A. S 1052(o (2000).
'9 Nob's, supra note 12
2o SeeAberommbie, 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting the difference between suggestive marks that
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if the mark achieves secondary meaning, the mark will help the customer identify
the product with a specific maker of the product," thus making the term
distinctive.22 Put another way, a term that achieves secondary meaning tells the
customer "who" the source is, not "what" the source is.
3
The basic concept of secondary meaning "recognizes that words with an
ordinary and primary meaning of their own 'may [after] long use with a particular
product, come to be known by the public as specifically designating that
product."' 24 If the product receives a secondary meaning among the public then,
under common law, the trademark is protected. If the term, however, remains
merely descriptive, it is not eligible for protection. The burden is on the plaintiff
to establish the secondary meaning, and this is not an easy burden to meet'





An example of a descriptive term that has achieved secondary meaning is
"America Online. ' V America Online is an internet service provider. Although
the term "America Online" is descriptive of its service, the term is recognized by
the public as one specific internet service provider. When a product becomes
associated with a single source, such as in this case, its descriptive term becomes
distinctive. 2  Because "America Online" has achieved a secondary meaning
among the consuming public, as a single internet service provider, the term
describe a product in a way that requires "thought and perception" and merely descriptive marks that
describe the product in an immediate fashion); see also In r Application of Quick-Print Copy Shops,
Inc., 616 F.2d 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
2 AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir. 1986); Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv.
Banking Corp. (Investacorp) E.C., 931 F.2d 1519,1524 (11th Cir. 1991).
22 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (noting that to achieve
significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product bit the prducer)
(emphasis added).
' Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ'n, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143,1147 (9th Cir. 1999).
ee also Kellogg Co., 305 U.S. at 118. Also note that de facto secondary meaning, "the repeated use
of ordinary words functioning within the heartland of their ordinary meaning," makes the descriptive
term no more inherently distinctive than a descriptive term with no secondary meaning. 1 J. Thomas
McCarthy, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrrIoN § 7:6 (2d ed. 1984). See also A.J. Canfield Co.
v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting "[tjo the extent that a trademark also
communicates functional characteristics, it does not function as a trademark"). E.g., Vision Ctr., 596
F.2d at 117 (holding that even if the descriptive term "Vision Center" acquired secondary meaning,
fair use by other eye centers could not be prevented).
24 MERGES, srranote 1, at 582 (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 492 F.2d
474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974)).
25 Viion Ctr., 596 F.2d at 118.
26 id
27 Other examples include: Ben andJerry's Ice Cream, Park W F, and Northern Dairy.
28 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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"America Online" shifts from the unprotected category of merely descriptive
terms to the protected category of distinctive terms.
The fourth category of terms is generic terms. If a term is generic or becomes
generic, then it is offered no protection at common law." A generic mark
universally describes the good or service that it identifies, rather than distinguish-
ing the product from others in its same class.' There are several tests for
determining whether a term is generic. The most common test is whether the
public views the mark as the common name of the product, or the product's
origin. 1 To apply the test, the court considers as evidence: dictionary definitions,
generic use of the term by competitors and other persons in the trade, the
plaintiff's own generic use, generic use in the media, and consumer surveys.
3 2
Another test is whether the term refers to the genus or class of which a particular
product is a member.3 For example, a shoe store could not receive protection
for the name "Shoes" because that name simply describes the product that it
sells-without distinguishing it from other stores that also sell the same product,
shoes. Similarly, King-Seeley Thermos Co., the original manufacturer of
"thermos" bottles, will no longer receive exclusive protection for the term
"thermos" because this term has become the common name for saying "vacuum-
insulated bottle."' Because the costs of granting exclusive rights in generic terms
are extremely high, these terms receive no protection.
B. LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act3 was enacted in 1946 to codify the existing trademark
legislation and common law rules, in an attempt to "eliminate judicial
SZataian's, 698 F.2d at 786; see American Heritage, 494 F.2d at 14.
o Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); American Heritage, 494
F.2d at 11; Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Sun Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.
1981); Vision Or., 596 F.2d at 115-16. See also 15 U.S.C.A. S 1065(4) (2000).
11 Kelgg Co., 305 U.S. at 111. See aoli 15 U.S.C.A. S 1064(3) (2000).
32 Pilates, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 296. See ako Brandwynne v. Combe Int'l, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 364,
381 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
3 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976), Ale House
Mgmt., Inc. v. Raleigh Ale House, Inc., 205 F.3d 137,140 (4th Cir. 2000).
' King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d. Cir. 1963) (holding that the
mark "thermos" for vacuum-insulated bottles has become generic). See aLso Bayer Co. v. United
Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (holding that the mark "asprin" had become generic because
it became synonymous with salicylic acid itsel). But set Xerox Corp. v. Litton Indus., 353 F. Supp.
412, 177 U.S.P.Q. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Xerox spent a lot of money to keep its marks from
becoming generic. In an expensive ad campaign, it asked customers to use the mark as a noun, not
a verb).
35 15 U.S.C. S 1051 (2000).
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obscurity,... make procedure simple, and relief against infringement prompt and
effective." '36 Under this Act, a trademark is defined as
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-1)
used by a person, or 2) which a person has a bona fide intention to
use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register,...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others .... 37
The Act prohibits the use of another's trademark without permission in
connection with a sale.3
The Act serves two purposes." The first purpose is to protect consumers in
the marketplace and the second purpose is to protect a company's time and
investment in establishing goodwill.' Because of the emphasis in protecting
against customer confusion, the Act does not always prevent others from using
marks that are the same or similar to registered marks.4' Instead, the Act protects
against using the same or similar mark only if the use of that mark is confusingly
similar to the registered mark.42 If consumers are not likely to be confused by the
similar use of terms, then the Act has not been violated, and therefore, the similar
use is not an infringing use.43 For example, if two companies are in different lines
of business, such as ABC paint and ABC network, they may both use the "ABC"
mark. Because consumers would not likely be confused as to the source of these
non-competing goods and services, there would be no infringement, regardless
of which company acquired the mark first.
On the other hand, because the purpose of the Act is to protect customers,
any good faith defense to a valid infringement claim would not prevent a finding
of infringement." Thus, it would not matter if two companies were in the same
line of business and one company unknowingly infringed on the other's registered
- S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1946).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
38 Id
39 Id.
'0 Id The Senate Committee on Patents gave two reasons for trademark legislation. The first
is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. The
second is where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the
public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
41 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
42 See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946) (quoting Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S.
359, 368 (1924)).
41 AMF, 599 F.2d at 341.
" Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,596 (5th Cir. 1985).
2002]
7
Rizzo: Does the Lanham Act Lose Meaning for Companies That Operate Exclu
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2002
J. INTELL PROP. LV
trademark; the former would still be liable for trademark infringement if
consumers are likely to be confused.
There are also other benefits of registering a trademark. These include: federal
jurisdiction45 and prima fade evidence of the right to use the mark in trade.' The
first benefit, federal jurisdiction is often important because federal judges tend to
have more experience with trademarks than state judges.47 This difference is
significant in the context of trademark-domain name disputes. After the trial
court makes a decision on the domain name, the NIP awards the trial winner the
right to use the mark before the decision may be appealed.' It is, therefore,
better to have a federal judge who is more familiar with the trademark laws and
their applications to first hear the case, than one who is not. This way insures that
the party lawfully using the mark does not lose its rights during the time that the
trial court reaches its decision and the appellate court overturns that decision.
The second benefit of registering a trademark is that the registration serves as
prima facie evidence of the validity of the exclusive right to use that mark. 9
Section 7(b) of the Lanham Act provides that a federal registration "shall be
prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration
of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's
exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce or in connection with the
goods or services specified in the certificate."' Registering a mark is said to give
notice to the world,5 so that a fair use or good faith defense would be invalid
against a registered mark.52 A federal registration also gives the court the
discretion to allow up to three-times the amount of actual damages found," in
addition to sometimes awarding attorney fees to the winner.' And after a period
of five years of continuous and exclusive use the registered mark may become
incontestable.5 5 When a mark becomes incontestable, certain defenses to
infringing uses are no longer valid.- For example, the generic use and lack of
41 15 US.C. S 1121 (1995).
15 U.S.C. S 1057(b) (1995).
4' Laurence H. Pretty, Owriw of Baric Prtnipks of Tradmark Law and Uxfair Competition (1994),
in BAILA H. CELEDONIA &THoMAS E. SmITH, REvIEWOFBASIC PRINCIPLES OFTRADEMARKLAW,
IN UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW 1995 27,51 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks,
& Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-413, 1995).
48 Id
-9 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1995).
0 Id
51 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1995).
52 Pretty, supra note 47, at 53.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1995).
54 Id
11 15 U.S.C. § 1115Pt) (1995).5' Pretty, supra note 47, at 52.
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secondary meaning defenses may no longer be properly asserted against the
trademark owner in an action for infringement. 7
C. DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATION
Every site on the internet" has an Internetworking Protocol Address (IP
Address). 9 This IP Address is a string of numbers that are used to identify a
specific network.' Because it is hard to remember an IP Address, the more user
friendly mnemonic classification, known as the domain name, was created." The
computer programs that help to connect users to the Internet have been
programmed to find the specific IP Address that each domain name represents. 2
Some argue that a domain name is nothing more than a street address, and
therefore, trademark law should not apply to it, just like it does not apply to street
addresses. 3 For example, the argument is as follows: because a company selling
low-end cameras could not be sued by Kodak Co. simply because it maintains a
store at 5500 Kodak Drive, the same low-end camera store should not be sued for
maintaining its website at 100.22.99, which happens to be the equivalent of
www.kodak.com. The reality of the situation, however, is that domain names are
different from street addresses, and should therefore, be treated differently.
First, domain names represent more than an Internet-site location. Domain
names become an identifier for Internet-operating companies." Second, the IP
addresses are different than most street addresses in that the Internet occupier
actually gets to choose its "address." 5 Because no "Yellow Pages" of the Internet
7 Id
5' The internet was developed in the 1960's by the United States Defense Department as a
commercial network that would be unaffected by nuclear attack. It has now, however, become the
new channel of commerce. See Dan L Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobabn: A First Look at Emerging
Law ofCberarks, I RiCH.J.L & TEcH. 1, 6-7; 12 (1995) (reasoning that "[t]he internet began as a
product of Cold War military technology, linking together researchers involved in a research program
sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense").
'9 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1997).
60 d
61 A "domain name" means any alphanumeric designation which is registered with a domain
name registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
62 Burk, supra note 58, at 10.
63 Richard L. Baum & Robert C. Cumbow, First Use: Kej Test in Interna Domadn Difptes, 18
NATL. L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C17.
They identify the source of a good, as well as, serve as an address. Id See Accuride Intl, Inc.
v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1534-36, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589, 1591-92 (9th Cir. 1989).
65 In this fashion, many think that internet addresses are more similar to mnemonic telephone
numbers or radio broadcast identifiers, which do receive protection under trademark law. See Dial-a-
Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1644, 1645-46 (2d Cir.
1989) ('Telephone numbers may be protected as trademarks, and a competitor's use ofa confusingly
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exists listing all numeric or mnemonic addresses," it is essential for those
operating over the Internet to have a memorable name. 7 In fact, it has been said
that these names operate as electronic signs on the internet' and the corporate
identity in the information age. 9 Ideally, a company would like to use its
trademark as its identifying domain name." A problem, however, arises when
two companies, in separate lines of business, have a valid trademark in the same
mark. For example, there could be a Four Seasons hotel chain and a Four
Seasons clothing manufacturer that could both have a valid trademark in the mark
"Four Seasons."" But, only one of these companies would be able to use the
domain name "www.FourSeasons.com."
Acronyms also compound the problem of using a trademark as a domain
name. 2 Because a domain name can contain a maximum of only twenty-six
letters," companies that have completely different names, often apply for the
same domain name. For example, American Telephone and Telegraph and
Allison's Tricks and Trinkets could both apply for the domain name "www.
at&t.com," but only one of the companies would be able to use the site."
The same is true for geographic markets. For example, the Sweetie Bakery in
Alabama and the Sweetie Bakery in California may both have a valid trademark
in the mark "Sweetie" because of their distinct regional markets, but when
similar telephone number may be enjoined as... trademark infringement."). See alo 1-800-RACE-
TEAM; Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Greater Boston Radio, II, Inc., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925 (D.
Mass. 1993) (applying trademark law to the likelihood of confusion regarding radio station call
letters); Pathfinder Communications Corp. v. Midwest Communications Co., 593 F. Supp. 281,224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (applying trademark law to radio station call letters).
6Robert J. Raskopf, Tradmarks andthe Internet, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTruTE
416 PLI/Pat 1047, 1051 (1995).
67 Gary W. Hamilton, Trademarks on the Internet: Confiuion, Colsion or Dilktion?, 4 TEX. INTEL.
PROP. LJ. 1,2 (1995); seeJames West Marcovitz, ronahi wcdra/ds.om-'Owning a Bitchin' "Corporate
Trademark as an InternetAddress-Infingement?, 17 CARDoZO L REV. 85, 91 (1995); see also ED KROL,
THE WHOLE INTERNET 18-19 (2d ed. 1994).
Raskopf, supra note 66, at 1051.
69 Hamilton, supra note 67, at 2.
70Id at 5-6. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1163 (1995) (lIt is the source distinguishing ability of a mark-not its ontological status as
color, shape, fragrance, word or sign that permits it to serve these basic purposes.").
7 See Pathfinder Communicatiom Cop., 593 F. Supp. at 285 (e.g., Domino's Pizza and Domino's
Sugar can co-exist without infringement because there is no likelihood of confusion between the two
products).
72 Hamilton, spra note 67, at 4.
73 Gervaise Davis III, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: History and Recent Devebpments In
Domestic and International Diputes: Enabing Ekctronic Commerc on the Internet, 670 PLI/Pat 551, 561
(2001).
74 Hamilton, supra note 67, at 2.
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registering a web-site, only one of the companies may use the domain name
"www.sweetiebakery.com," even if it were the second company to come into
existence s
The Internet Network Information Center (InterNIC) assigns domain
names.76 InterNIC operates under the control of the National Science Founda-
tion, under the company name Network Solutions, Inc.' To get a domain name,
an applicant must contact InterNIC. 8 InterNIC issues domain names on a first
come, first served basis.79 They do not question or verify rights to domain
names.' Because they receive over 35,000 applications per month,8 they do not
have the time nor the resources needed to inspect every application."2 Thus, the
possibility for trademark infringement arises.
In July of 1995 and September of 1996, InterNIC amended its policy for
assigning domain names. Prior to July 1995, an applicant had to only fill-out an
application to get a domain name; the applicant did not even have to pay a fee. 3
After a string of lawsuits, InterNIC changed its policy.
The first lawsuit came in 1994 when, the Council of Better Business Bureaus
(CBBB), the umbrella organization for the 138 Better Business Bureaus, tried to
obtain the domain name "bbb.com" and learned that it was already registered to
Mark Sloo, who was not currently using the site." CBBB owns the trademark
"BBB" and sued Mark Sloo for trademark infringement." CBBB asserted that
the registration of the 'bbb' name prevents the Better Business Bureau system
7s SeeA. Boujois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Person's Co. v. Catherine Christman, 900
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
76 Joshua Quittner, Life in Cberspace: Yom Desv a Break Today, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 1994, at A5,
availab at 1994 WL 7444048.
7Id
78 Stewart Ugelow, Addrrsxfor Succes Intent Name Game; Indiridials Snar Up Poknfi4 Valmabk
Coporate E-Mailr IDs, WASH. PosT, Aug. 11, 1994, at Al, availab at 1994 WL 2434315.
" Id See Panavision v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) ("NSI registers names on
a first-come, first-served basis for a $100 registration fee."); Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Brian Wick
& Am. Distribution Sys., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1126-27 (D. Colo. 2000) (Registrars "assign
domain names on a first-come, first-served basis upon payment of a registration fee.").
"0 Jared Sandberg, Primeton Review Mnst Drop Walan' E-Mail Addres, Pivate Arbitrator Rxks,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 6, 1994, at B8, availabk at 1994 WL-WSJ 2047646; see Panavi'on, 141 F.3d at 1318-
19 ("NSI does not make a determination about a registrant's right to use a domain name.').
1' Richard L Baum & Robert C. Cumbow, First Use: KV Test in Interet Domain Disptej, 18
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C17.
82 Id
3 Hamilton, supra note 67, at 3-4.
84 Bter Badness Bureau Sues For InternetAddress, Newsbytes News Network, May 15, 1995, available
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from using its own famous identifier as an Internet address.86 It also alleged that
"consumers and businesses would be misled into thinking that by contacting
'bbb.org' and 'bbb.com' they would obtain information from one of our Better
Business Bureaus."' Before that case was decided, however, another company
named KnowledgeNet tried to register the domain name "knowledgenet.com."8
After finding out that the domain was already registered by David Boone for his
independent-business-consultants trade association's intemet-site, KnowledgeNet
filed suit against Boone for trademark infringement, and against InterNIC and
Boone's service provider for aiding and abetting Boone's infringement activities.89
This was the first time that InterNIC had ever been directly named in a suit.90
Because InterNIC and Boone's service provider ended up settling on undisclosed
terms, the court never made a ruling on whether InterNIC or a service provider
could also be sued in a trademark infringement action relating to domain name
assignments.9
As a safety measure, however, InterNIC, in 1995, amended its domain name
assignment policy. Not only did it begin to charge a one hundred dollar
application fee and a fifty dollar yearly maintenance fee for every year after the
first two years,92 it also changed the way applicants register. The July 1995
amendments require an applicant to own the "right to the domain name," which
means that the domain name cannot infringe upon another's trademark.93 The
new policy actually shifts the responsibility onto the applicant to make sure that
there are no trademark violations.94 The policy requires each applicant to
represent and warrant, among other things, that it may rightfully use and intends
to use on a regular basis the proposed domain name, that use by the applicant of
the proposed name-would not violate any trademark or other intellectual property
right of a third party, and that the applicant does not seek to use the domain name
for the purpose of confusing or misleading any person.95
87 Id
" Knowledgenet v. David Boone: Parties Try to Settle Internet Trademark Suit, Info. L Alert:
A Voorhees Report, May 12, 1995.
90 Id
91 Id
92 NSI Canges Domdn Name Rgiration Poiy, INTERNET WEEK, July 31,1995, available at 1995
WL 10264632 (quoting David Graves, Internet business Manager for NSI).
93 ld SeeAvon, Hijacker, Info. L Alert A Voorhees Rep., Apr. 5, 1996, at 1.
" See Carl Oppedahl,Avoidthe Traps in th New Rks ForRegistinng a Doman Name, N.Y.L.J.,Aug.
8, 1995, at 5 (col. 1) (noting that an applicant must represent that the use or registration of the
domain name does not interfere with the right of any third party with respect to a trademark, service
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InterNIC also requires the applicant to sign an indemnification clause stating
that if the domain name holder is sued in an action for trademark infringement,
it will indemnify InterNIC, and the policy specifically states that InterNIC will not
perform a trademark search.96 And finally, the new amendment also tries to limit
the "warehousing" of a domain name by requiring that the domain name be used
within ninety days of issuance.97 If the name is not regularly used for a period of
ninety days or more, then InterNIC, upon request, may make that name available
for use by another party.98 The policy reserves the right for InterNIC to suspend
or ban the use of the domain name from the applicant if a dispute arisesY In that
case, InterNIC would give the applicant ninety days to set up a new non-
infringing domain name, and at the end of the ninety day transition period
InterNIC will place the disputed domain name on hold until an agreement is
reached by the parties or in court."
Further amendments to the policy came with yet another lawsuit. In 1996,
Hasbro, the maker of the children's board game Candy Land, sued Internet
Entertainment Group Ltd. for setting up a cybersex and nudity website at the
address "candyland.com."'' Hasbro sued under the theory of trademark dilution,
stating that the pornographic Internet-site was diluting the wholesome nature of
9 NSI Domain Name Dispute Policy Statement (Revision 01, Effective Nov. 23,1995), avdab/e
at ftp://rs.intemic.net/policy/intefic/intemicdomain-4.txt [hereinafter InterNic Policy 1995].
97 Id
The warehousing of names means storing names without ever using them. Warehousing is
usually done by those who wish to hold the domain name hostage until the company that has the
real interest in using the domain name pays a larger sum of money to the warehouser than the
warehouser paid to acquire the name.
Warehousing is also used by those who do not want their competitors to be able to use names
associated with their companies. For example, in the Kaplan case, Princeton Review realized that
its biggest competitor in the standardized test prepatation arena, Kaplan, had yet to register the
domain name "Kaplan.com," so Princeton Review bought the rights to the name, and prevented
Kaplan from later being able to use the name. Princeton Review began posting its ads to the
"www.Kaplan.com" website, and after Kaplan brought suit, the two parties settled under undisclosed
terms.
Warehousing is also used by companies that want to buy the rights to domain names that
create bad publicity for their companies. For example, Proctor & Gamble bought the rights to a
number of sites, such as "www.badbreath.com," "www.headache.com," and "www.dandruff.com"
for fear that another would use these sites to post negative comments about Proctor & Gamble and
their products.
98 Christine Hudgins-Bonafield, InterNIC Seeks Guidan on Name Disputes, NETWORK
COMPUTING, Feb. 15, 1996, at 34.
" Id
100 1d
01 Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11626, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (order granting preliminary injunction).
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the game. 0 2 Internet Entertainment Group unsuccessfully defended itself on the
ground that its website had nothing to do with Candy Land the board game and
that its customers were never confused into thinking they were going to receive
a child's board game. The court, however, issued the injunction against Internet
Entertainment Group, and thus marked the first case to reach a decision on
trademark infringement by a domain name. 3
In response, InterNIC revised its policy in September of 1996. The new
policy requires a trademark owner to first contact a domain holder, before asking
InterNIC to get involved."' After doing so, InterNIC will take action only upon
receiving a certified copy of the federally registered trademark and proof that a
copy of written notice was sent to the domain name holder.' Then, if the
domain name holder can prove that its domain name registration predates the
trademark registration, or that it also has a trademark in the domain name,
InterNIC will not get involved."°  This policy, however, demonstrates the
potential problem that may arise when two companies, in different lines of
business, both own a valid trademark in the same mark."7 For example, what
should happen when ABC network wants to sue ABC paint for the domain name
of "abc.com"?
D. ANTI-CYBERSQUATING ACT
President Clinton signed the Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act, also
known as the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) into law on
102 Id
103 Id
"0 NSI Domain Name Dispute Policy Statement, atftp://intemic.net/policy/intemic/intemic.
domain-6.txt (Revision 02, Effective Sept. 9, 1996) [hereinafter InterNIC Policy 1996].
106 Id
07 For InterNIC to recognize the trademark as valid, the company must have registered the
domain name after getting a valid trademark. This policy is to prevent companies from getting the
registration ownership rights and then going to a foreign country to file the trademark. See Intenet
Domain Name 'Squattrs'Lo e 'Tian Defetue', WEST'S LEGAL NEWs, Aug. 21,1996, available at 1996
WL 470232 (noting that domain "squatter" would no longer be able to assert a "quickie" trademark
status against bona fide US federal trademark holders).
[Vol. 10:211
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November 29,1999.'08 This Act amends the Lanham Act"° and incorporates the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act for infringement based on domain name
registration."'
Cybersquatting "refers to the deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of
Internet domain names in violation of the rights of trademark owners." '' The
Anti-Cybersquatting Act was passed "to protect consumers and American
businesses, to promote the growth of online commerce, and to provide clarity in
the law for trademark owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration
of distinctive marks and Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the
good-will associated with such marks." ' 2 This Act applies to only domain name
registrations, not metatags, and may include: the registration of another's mark
as a domain name, the registration of a misspelling of another's mark, the
registration of another's mark for use with a suffix other than ".com", the
registration of another's mark as part of a domain name, the registration of
another individual's name as a domain name, the registration of a mark of a
competitor, and the registration of an organization opposed by the registrant.'"
Remedies are available in injunctive, traditional monetary, and statutory relief.
Injunctive relief includes: forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name
registration or the transfer of the domain name to the holder.1 4 Traditional
monetary remedies are available under Section 35 of the Lanham Act.1 ' In lieu
of actual damages, the court may award statutory damages ranging from $1,000
to $100,000 per domain name offense."6
105 Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999).
See a/re the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) at http://www.icann.org/
dndr/udrp/policy, htm (last updated May 17, 2002). The policy was created by the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and submission of complaints by the
major domain name registrars began January 3, 2000. While the UDRP decisions have been
inconsistent the UDRP has proven to be a cost effective tool for holding cybersquatters liable. But,
the ACPA seems better equipped to handle the more complex cybersquatting cases.
109 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999) (amending New Section 43(d)).
110 Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c) (Supp. V 1999). See Panavision Intern.,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant liable under the FTDA for
registering pavavision.com and attempting to sell it for $13,000 to plaintiff, owner of the trademark
Panavision).
l 15 U.S.C. S 1125 (Supp. V 1999).
112 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
'"Steven R. Borgman, The NewFedealCyhbnqtingLaws, 8 TEX. INTELL PROP. L.J. 265,266-
67.
114 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) (extending injunctive relief already available under the Lanham Act
to plaintiffs suing under the ACPA).
1 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) (extending damage remedies already available under the Lanharn
Act to plaintiffs suing under the ACPA).
116 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (2000).
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In order to prevail under the statute, the person bringing the suit must show
that: (1) the plaintiffs mark is distinctive or famous; (2) the defendant's domain
name is identical or confusingly similar17 to the plaintiffs distinctive or famous
mark or dilutive of the plaintiff's famous mark; and (3) that the defendant used,
registered, or trafficked in the domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from
the plaintiff's mark."' The majority of the cases involving cybersquatting focus
on the third requirement, proving bad faith on the part of the infringer.
A bad faith user is one that tries to maximize the advantage of another
company's consumer association by linking that association to its domain name."'
The Anti-Cybersquatting Act suggests nine factors that the court should consider
in determining bad faith.1 "
The first bad faith factor that the court should consider in making this
determination is "the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person,
if any, in the domain name.""' This factor, however, is interpreted very narrowly,
and considers only the rights of the parties at the time that the domain name was
registered.'
The second factor is "the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify
that person."'" Congress included this factor to protect individuals who
registered their names or nicknames as domain names,4 but it does not provide
an absolute defense against a claim for cybersquatting when the name is a well-
known or famous mark.'"
The third factor relates to "the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name
in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services."' 26 Where a
"' Note that "confusingly similar" is a different standard than the "likelihood to confuse"
standard that is applied in trademark infringement cases. The "confusingly similar" standard is more
narrow in approach in that it looks at the marks only to test their similarity. Unlike the "likelihood
to confuse" standard, this "confusingly similar" approach does not consider the nature of the
products or services nor the relative markets in which the marks are used.
118 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
19 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that the defendant's acknowledgment that its registered domain might be confused with the
plaintiff's weighs in favor of a finding of bad faith).
120 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(l)-(1X) (2000).
121 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(1).
' See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489,496 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that Sporty's Farm did not have rights in the domain name "sportys.com" because Sporty's Farm
did not form until nine months after Sportman's Market registered the name).
123 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B3)(i)(1I).
124 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13 (1999).
125 Id
126 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(111).
[Vol. 10:211
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person uses the domain name in a way that does not constitute trademark
infringement, the formal registration of that domain name does not create liability
under the Anti-Cybersquatting Act." Thus, where there is an absence of
confusion concerning the mark, its registration as a domain name may indicate
good faith.1"
The fourth factor considers the registrant's "bona fide noncommercial or fair
use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name."'"0 This factor allows
the noncommercial or fair use of another's mark for purposes such as in
"comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, etc.' 130
The fifth factor is
the person's intent to divert customers from the mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that
could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark,
by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the site.
131
This factor targets cybersquatters who try to use an established mark to sell
inferior goods, defraud consumers into releasing personally identifiable
information, such as credit card numbers, to attract intemet users to sites that
price advertising to the number of "hits" the sites generate, and to tarnish the
value of the mark' 32
The sixth factor indicating a bad-faith use is the registrant's
offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the
mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having
used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide
offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct. 3
Although this factor addresses one of the most commonly occurring examples
of cybersquatting, this factor alone is not dispositive proof for finding bad faith.'U
I" S. REP. No. 106-140, at 13-14.
in Id
'12 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d)(1)(B)()(IV) (2000).
130 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 14 (1999).
132 15 U.S.C. § 112(d)(1)(B)(1(V) (2000).
132 S. REP. No. 106-40, at 14-15 (1999).3 15 u.s.C. S 112s(d)(1)(B)OI(VI)( (2000).
'34 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15 (1999).
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The seventh factor requires the court to consider the registrant's "provision
of material and misleading false contact information when applying for the
registration of the domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain
accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern
of such conduct."' 35 This factor is included because it has been found that most
cases involving cybersquatting begin with a registrant who provides false
information, which makes the cybersquatter very hard to locate once the domain
name has been registered. 36
The eighth factor relates to the registrant's
registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others
that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names,
or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties.
137
This factor addresses the problem of "warehousing.""13 Cybersquatters not
liable under the FTDA3 9 when they hold onto a name and wait for the mark
owner to offer them money, may be liable under this Act."'
The ninth factor is "the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning
of [the FTDA]."'' This factor focuses on protecting the most vulnerable marks,
the marks that are most attractive to cybersquatters because of their consumer
recognition." 2
The most obvious cases of cybersquatting are those that include a number of
these bad faith indicators. For example, in Virtual Works, Inc. v. Vo/kwagen of
America, Inc., the court found that Virtual Works, Inc.'s registration of "vw.net"
as its domain name was done in bad faith. 43 The court reasoned that Volkswagen
already had consumer recognition of the "VW" mark, and that the domain name
135 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VHI).
'-6 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10, 15.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VIII).
138 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15-16.
139 See S. REP. No., 106-140, at 15-16 (liability under the FTDA requires that the dilutor "solicit
buyers'.
'4 Id at 15-16.
141 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(X) (2000). See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000) (listing the FTDA
factors for determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous).
142 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 15-16.
143 Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2001).
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"vwi.org" or "vwi.net" would have satisfied Virtual Works, Inc. criteria for a
domain name.144 The court also found convincing evidence that Virtual Works,
Inc. offered to sell the domain name "vw.net" to Volkswagen for a very large
price or auction it off to the next highest bidder.' Although it appears that
Virtual Works, Inc. was simply trying to profit from the "VW" mark established
by Volkswagen, most cases involving bad faith in domain name registrations are
more complicated.
Proving bad faith in domain name registration is more often a harder principle
to meet.'" What complicates the weighing of the bad faith factors is the fair use
absolute defense. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act states that
bad faith intent "shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that
the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the
domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful."' 47
For example, in Chatam International, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., Bodum had the right to
use the mark "Chambord" in connection with a line of coffee makers, but not for
coffee.'" The court ruled earlier that using the mark "Chambord" in connection
with the beverage coffee was an infringing use, likely to cause confusion with
Chatam International, Inc.'s registered use of the mark for its upscale food
products, including its raspberry liqueur and fruit preserves. 49 Bodum, however,
was able to set up a website selling both its "Chambord" coffee makers and its
coffee, using the domain name "Chambord.com."''  The court found that this
use did not violate trademark laws or the newly amended Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act.'' Because Bodum was selling coffee makers with the
"Chambord" mark, which was a legitimate and non-infringing use for the
"Chambord" mark, it could not be said that the company used the mark in bad
faith by registering it as their domain name."' The mere fact that the company
also sold coffee at this site was not enough to find that the company had violated
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. Instead, the judge stated that
the Act exculpates defendants who have a good-faith belief that their use of a
144 Id at 269.
141 Id at 270.
14 See Chatam Int'l, Inc. v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff4 40 Fed.
Appx. 685 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that alleged infringer did not register domain name with bad faith
intent); Mars Musical Adventures, Inc. v. Mars, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding
that issue of fact as to whether alleged infringer had bad faith intent to profit from competitor's
domain name precluded summary judgment).
"1' Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(d)(1)(B)(h) (2000).
148 Chat,, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
149 Id at 551.
'w Id at 552.
1 Id at 551.
152 Id at 554.
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domain name is "fair... or otherwise lawful," and that provision appears to apply
to Bodum.
15 3
The judge continued to explain that the only confusion that is likely to occur
is "initial interest confusion."5 4 Once customers see the websites, they would
realize that Bodum's coffee makers and coffee-selling website is not the same as
Chatam's raspberry liqueur."' 5 Because Internet users are accustomed to such
"false starts" when looking for companies on the Internet, they would not likely
be confused beyond this initial interest confusion."5 6 Thus, the initial interest
confusion is not enough to find infringement because no good will of Chatam's
will be misplaced on Bodum.5 7
On the other hand, where the domain name is registered for the purpose of
causing initial interest confusion, courts have found that the bad faith requirement
has been met. For example, in Peopk for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimaLr v. Doughney,
the plaintiff had established recognition in the mark "PETA."'' 5  When the
defendant registered the domain name "peta.org" and named the website "People
Eating Tasty Animals," the court found a bad intent on the part of the defendant
for trying to capitalize on the plaintiff's mark: The court found that the defendant
evidenced a bad intent in trying to create initial interest confusion by using the
"Peta" mark, trick customers into visiting their website.'5 s Although the court
stated that a company could set up such a website to complain about the
organization PETA, it could not use the organization's mark to trick web users
into visiting its site as the defendants did in this case."6
However, not all cases involve bad faith or misappropriation. Thus, while the
new Anti-Cybersquatting law helps to prevent domain name misappropriation,
it still does not prevent a valid company from obtaining trademark-like rights that
it could not otherwise obtain under the traditional trademark laws.
153 Chatam, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
154 Id at 557.
155 Id at 559.
156 Id
157 Id
.5. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1109 (4th Cir. 2001).
159 Id
" See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653
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III. ANALYSIS
Even with the new Anti-Cybersquatting Act, domain name registration may
still give companies certain protections that the companies would otherwise be
unable to obtain under the Lanham Act.
A. GENERIC NAMES
The first way in which a company could obtain greater rights with a domain
name registration over a trademark registration is in the area of generic names.
For example, a company could register a generic name or even a descriptive name
with no secondary meaning as its domain name. But, a company could not do the
same for trademark status under the Lanham Act."" For companies operating
exclusively over the Internet, this is important because these types of companies
generally register the name of their company as their domain name. Thus, by
being the first to register the generic name of the company (i.e.
"GroceryStore.com") as its Internet domain, the company can prevent other
companies from using the exact same name, even though it is simply the generic
name for its product. Furthermore, because the domain name also functions as
the advertising billboard of the Internet, no other company could even "hang" the
same sign for advertisement purposes. Under the existing trademark laws,
traditional bricks and mortar companies cannot do the same. For example, the
bricks and mortar "Grocery Store" can not prevent other grocery stores from
calling themselves by the exact same name, nor prevent other grocery stores from
creating billboards to advertise their "Grocery Stores."
The rights associated with Internet-based companies, however, extend even
further. These Intemet-based companies can also buy the rights to any variation
of the company's name and further prevent derivative uses by competitors. For
example, "GroceryStore.com" could buy the rights to variations such as
"Groceries.the.Store.corn" and further prevent others from the generic use of that
name. On the other hand, a traditional bricks and mortar grocery store generically
named "Grocery Store" could never prevent other companies from calling
themselves by the same name or any derivative thereof.6 '
B. REGISTRATION
Registering exclusive rights is also easier for companies operating exclusively
over the Intemet. With domain name registration, a company can receive
161 Se Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
162 Generic names receive no protection under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. S 1064(3) (2002).
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exclusive rights to a name in a matter of minutes. 63 The system is almost entirely
automated, so the registrar must check only the NSI database to make sure that
no one else has an existing identical name before issuing the domain name.'
64
Furthermore, to save time, the registrant can perform this search before
registering by searching http://www.intemic.net/whois.html.16' After the NSI
performs the search, the registrant has to only pay a fee to receive exclusive rights
to a name.
166
On the other hand, under the Lanham Act, a company must undergo a lengthy
registration process to receive exclusive rights to its name. This lengthy process
requires the company to wait a year, in which any other company may challenge
the company's registration, before it will be issued a protected trademark.167 If
another company, or the Patent and Trademark Office itself, challenges the
registration, the company registering the rights must defend its registration.6"
The company must then file an answer to the challenge and the Patent and
Trademark Office will make a ruling on the issue. 69 This process could take a
number of years and require a company to expend a number of resources in doing
so. The domain name registration process is far easier.
C. LOSS OF RIGHrMS
Furthermore, with domain name registration, once the company pays the fee,
the company does not lose the right to use the domain name.' The only way to
lose this right is through litigation by another. There is no monitoring of the
domain names by the domain name registrar.'7'
163 Davis, rpra note 73, at 563.
164 Id
'6 Id at 562.
166 The International Ad Hoc Committee, however, has recommended that InterNIC "publish
applications for domain names for a period of sixty days prior to assigning the requested domain
name to applicant" to bring the policy in-line with the United States Patent and Trademark Office's
policy for registering trademarks. Internet International Ad Hoc Committee, Final Report of the
International Ad Hoc Committee: Recommendations for Administration and Management of
gTLDs (Feb. 4,1997) http://www.iahc.org/draft-iahc-recommend-00.html [hereinafter Final IAC
Recommendations]. Seegexeral4 15 U.S.C. S 1062 (1988).
161 15 U.S.C.A. S 1051 (2002).
16 Id
169 Id
' The International Ad Hoc Committee has recommended that domain name assignments
should be renewed annually to bring the policy in-line with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office's policy that requires trademark owners to continuously use marks to keep common law
trademark and federally registered status. Final IAHC Recommendations, supra note 2, § 5.4. See
also 2J. Thomas McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition S 20.01 (3d ed. 1994).
m Davis, supra note 73, at 558.
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On the other hand, under the Lanham Act, after a company goes through the
lengthy process of acquiring rights, it could lose those rights due to generic use
of the term by that company or by the public in general.172 The bricks and mortar
company can also lose rights due to abandonment of the trademark.7 '
Abandonment is defined as nonuse of the mark and the intent not to use that
mark in the future. 74 Abandonment occurs when a company either does not use
the trademark for two consecutive years or when the company changes the use
of the trademark as it was originally registered.' Furthermore, courts have held
that "minor activities" are not sufficient to avoid a finding of abandonment
through nonuse. 7 6 Thus, the typical bricks and mortar companies could lose their
rights to registered trademarks even when they do use their trademarks, but in an
insufficient way. The internet-based company, however, does not even have to
use its domain name to keep its status.
D. ASSIGNMENT
In addition, with domain name registration, a company may freely buy, sell,
lease, and assign domain names." There are no requirements for these
transactions, other than they not be done in bad faith.'78
Under the Lanham Act, however, there are strict requirements for buying,
selling, leasing and assigning trademarks. For example, the company cannot just
sell or assign the trademark for a profit. Instead the company can assign the
trademark only if the "goodwill" of the company may be transferred.'79 The
goodwill of a company is generally defined as its customer base, and therefore, the
company gaining the rights to the trademark must be in the same line of business
as the original company for the goodwill of the original company to transfer."W
If an assignment attempts to transfer the naked right to use the mark and does
not include a transfer of goodwill, it is considered an assignment in gross and
172 15 U.S.C. 5 1064(3) (2002).
t71 15 U.S.C. § 1127; 15 U.S.C. S 1115(b)(2) (stating that defense of abandonment can even be
asserted against trademarks that have reached the five-year incontestable status).
174 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
,v Id
176 Stetson v. Howard D. Wolf & Assocs., 955 F.2d 847,851 (2d Cir. 1992).
'7 Davis, rupra note 73, at 559.
171 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
17 15 U.S.C.A. 51060.
"8 Goodwill is the "value attributable to a going concern apart from its physical assets-the
intangible worth of buyer momentum emanating from the reputation and integrity earned by the




Rizzo: Does the Lanham Act Lose Meaning for Companies That Operate Exclu
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2002
J. INTELL PROP. L
therefore invalid under both the common law and the Lanham Act.'81 Not only
is the assignment invalid, but it also operates to deprive the original trademark
owner of all rights because at this point the original owner has shown an intent
to abandon all rights in the mark.182 Thus, the flexibility of buying and selling
domain names also makes them more valuable.
E. SOLE RIGHTS
Finally, with domain name registration, if a company registers and obtains
ownership of a domain name, no other company can use it." 3 It is impossible for
two companies to obtain registration for the same domain name, and it is
therefore impossible for another company to use the exact same domain name
while it is in use by another company."'
Under the Lanham Act, however, two or more companies could feasibly use
the same trademarks. 8 ' Although one user might constitute an infringing user,
it is still a possibility. Furthermore, if another company uses the registered
trademark, it may not even constitute infringement. The fair use, local priority,
and no likelihood of confusion defenses provide exceptions in which others may
use registered marks in non-infringing ways." Thus, domain name registration
creates absolute exclusive rights, while trademarks at best create only a cause of
action for the non-infringing user.
F. INFRINGEMENT
In addition, the tests for infringement are different. For domain name
registration, the test is a very simple, bright-line rule: infringement occurs
whenever one uses another's validly registered name without permission.
18 7
Under the Lanham Act, however, the infringing user must create a likelihood
of confusion concerning the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties'
181 Id
'8 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2).
'8 Davis, supra note 73, at 556.
184 id
'as It is feasible to both use the same trademark even if one is an infringing user, whereas, with
a domain name, only one user may occupy the registered site.
1"6 See Bluebell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
17 Davis, supra note 73, at 558.
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goods or services. 8" Without this showing, the rightful owner of the trademark
may not enjoin others from using its mark.'89
The seven factors affecting the likelihood of confusion include: the type of
trademark, similarity of services, similarity of advertising, intent of the alleged
infringing user, and actual confusion.9
Weaker marks generally receive less protection than strong marks because they
are less distinctive than strong marks. The strength of the mark depends on the
extent of third party usage and the relationship between the name and the product
it describes. 9 ' In cases where third party usage is high, the mark is less strongly
protected.92 Marks range on a sliding continuum from strongest to weakest in
the following order arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic. While
arbitrary marks receive the most protection, generic marks receive no
protection.' When marks are not so similar that they imply that there is a
connection between the two companies, there is less likelihood of confusion.
In deciding the similarity between marks, the court will consider the relative
strength and appearances of the similar or identical terms. Less protection is
given when the similar term is less distinctive, even if that term is the dominant
term.' But, in cases where the level of customer sophistication is relatively high,
for example, products that require a major investment decision on the part of the
consumer, the court will find that it is less likely that the consumer will be
confused by the similar marks. 9 And, finally, there has to be actual confusion
by customers. Although the company will not have to show actual proof of
confusion, the lack of such evidence works against the company alleging the
infringing use.'96 Thus, it is much harder for a trademark owner to win an
infringement suit than for a domain name owner to do the same.
""8 Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182,226 U.S.P.Q. 123, 126 (11th Cir.
1985), mry. denied, 474 U.S. 875 (1985); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160,
1164, 216 U.S.P.Q. 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1982); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44,45, 186
U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975); Continental Motors Corp. v. Cont'l Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857,
861, 153 U.S.P.Q. 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1967).
'89 Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45, 186 U.S.P.Q. 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1975).
'90 Id
391 Freedom, 757 F.2d at 1182.
192 Visio Cr, 596 F.2d at 117.
'"9 Id at 115-16.
'9 See Banfi Products Corp. v. Kendall-Jackson Winery Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y.
1999).
195 Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189, 213 U.S.P.Q. 91,
95 (5th Cir. 1981).
'" Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78, 8 U.S.P.Q. 1345, 1352 (2d Cit. 1988).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Lanham Act and Anti-Cybersquatting Act significantly help
businesses protect their trademark rights, these Acts do not address the pseudo-
trademark rights that internet-based companies obtain by domain name
registration alone. Furthermore, the fact that the internet generates more sales
revenue than any land-based operation makes domain name registration even
more valuable than the traditional trademark registration.
By becoming the first to register a domain name, intemet-based companies are
often able to acquire greater rights than they could under the traditional trademark
laws. For example, a company operating over the internet, like Netbank, could
register a generic name as its domain name and, therefore, create exclusive rights
in a generic term, whereas Baybank could not. By preventing all other internet-
based companies from using the same name, domain name registration confers
pseudo-trademark rights to intemet-based companies that they would otherwise
be unable to obtain under the traditional trademark analysis.
First, domain name registration helps a company establish these traditional
trademark rights in merely descriptive terms. When customers begin searching
the internet for a product, they generally type in "www.nameofthe product.com"
to see what comes up first. With instant name recognition, the company can
more easily establish the secondary meaning needed to make a merely descriptive
term eligible for trademark protection. With instant name recognition, domain
names also help companies establish and readily expand consumer goodwill,
which traditional trademark registrations are unable to do.
Second, the rights associated with domain name registration appear more
expansive. While trademark holders can prevent others from using a mark in a
context that might confuse consumers, they cannot become the exclusive user of
the mark in all areas of the market. On the other hand, the internet-based
company can prevent all users in all markets from using the exact same domain
name, which is in effect the name of the company. Further, the internet company
could also prevent other users from using similar derivatives of the domain name,
whereas the traditional trademark holder gets only the specific right(s) listed in its
registration.
Third, the ability to assign domain names to other companies provides a
lucrative opportunity for even legitimate companies, not in violation of the Anti-
Cybersquatting Act. For example, a company could set up a valid online
company, make a profitable name for itself, and then sell the rights of its domain
name to the highest bidder, regardless of whether any goodwill attaches. On the
other hand, owners of traditional trademarks could not do the same. To have a
valid assignment of a trademark, the consumer goodwill must attach.
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Fourth, it seems that the only way a legitimate business could lose its domain
registration rights is through a Federal Trademark Dilution Act claim. This claim,
however, could be defeated using the defenses of being the first user of the mark,
or being a simultaneous user of the trademark. Further, in generic name cases,
no claim could be asserted against the internet-based company, because, under the
Lanham Act and common law, trademarks do not exist in generic marks, even if
they do take on special meaning with the public. Thus, the use of a generic mark
as a domain name will always predate the alleging party's use as a trademark. On
the other hand, trademark registrants can lose their rights associated with their
trademark by misusing the mark or abandoning the mark.
Thus, some internet-based companies may want to reconsider the lengthy,
resource-consuming trademark registration process, especially where it appears
that it is easier to create customer recognition and goodwill, which is essentially
what a trademark is, through a domain name registration.
SHEILA D. RIzzo
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